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 In this treatise, some aspects of the relationship of religion to 
economic questions are examined, particularly those associated with wealth 
distribution, because of their inevitably close association with societal 
common good. Utilitarian philosophers argued that all decisions could be 
made according to the principal of the greatest “utility,” or benefit, to the 
greatest number of people. In this work therefore, the authors examined how 
it related to concepts of justice and fairness and to the doctrine of utility with 
the aim of building an inclusive society. The study noted that the ways in 
which scarce time, skill, and resources are used are often affected by 
religiously motivated decisions. For instance, a study of a Hindu caste, or a 
medieval manor, or some labour unions may reveal that economic questions 
concerning the production of goods and services are conditioned by religious 
values. A second economic question – the description of the way in which 
comparative values are ascribed to be products of society – is also 
influenced, at least to a small degree, by religious considerations. Some 
goods and services are worth more, have a higher economic value, because 
they have a religious value, and others are worth less because religion places 
a negative value upon them. The study discovered that religion affects the 
demand side of the familiar supply demand equation and on the other hand, 
may influence the supply side, if the values it upholds encourage or 
discourage the production of various goods and service. 
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Introduction 
Despite some perceived historical and cultural contingencies, there 
are particular religious attitudes and practices as well as common ethical 
values that can be identified for broadening and deepening economic and 
environmental perspectives. Therefore, we affirm the actual and potential 
contribution of religious ideas for informing and inspiring economic 
theology, environmental ethics, and grassroots activism. Religions are now 
reclaiming and reconstructing these powerful religious attitudes, practices, 
and values toward re-conceiving mutually enhancing human-Earth relations. 
Careful methodological reflection is needed in considering how to bring 
forward in coherent and convincing ways the resources of religious traditions 
in response to particular aspects of our current economic and environmental 
crisis.  It entails a self-reflexive yet creative approach to retrieving and 
reclaiming texts and traditions, reevaluating and re-examining what will be 
most efficacious, and thus restoring and reconstructing religious traditions in 
a creative postmodern world. All of this involves a major effort to evoke the 
power and potential of religious traditions to function even more effectively 
as sources of spiritual inspiration, moral transformation, and sustainable 
communities in the midst of the environmental challenges faced by the Earth 
community. That is because world religions are being recognized in their 
great variety as more than simply a belief in a transcendent deity or a means 
to an afterlife. Rather, religions are seen as providing a broad orientation to 
the cosmos and human roles in it. Attitudes toward nature thus have been 
significantly, although not exclusively, shaped by religious views for 
millennia in cultures around the globe.  
In this context, then, religions can be understood in their largest sense 
as a means whereby humans, recognizing the limitations of phenomenal 
reality, undertake specific practices to effect self-transformation and 
community cohesion within a cosmological context. Religions thus refer to 
those cosmological stories, symbol systems, ritual practices, ethical norms, 
historical processes, and institutional structures that transmit a view of the 
human as embedded in a world of meaning and responsibility, 
transformation and celebration. Religions connect humans with a divine 
presence or numinous force. They bond human communities and they assist 
in forging intimate relations with the broader inclusive community. 
The distribution of wealth is, however, less frequently and less 
systematically studied than the distribution of money income. Partly, this is 
because wealth can be hard to measure. Much wealth is held in the form of 
unrealized capital gains. A household receives a capital gain if sells an 
appreciated asset, such as shares in a company, land, or antiques, for more 
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than the price at which it purchased the asset. An asset may appreciate in 
value for a long time before it is actually sold. No one, however, will know 
exactly how much such an asset has really gained or lost in value until the 
owner actually does sell it, thus “realizing”—turning into actual dollars—the 
capital gain. Another reason why it is harder to get information on wealth is 
that—while people are required to report their annual incomes from wages 
and many investments for tax purposes—the government does not require 
everyone to regularly and comprehensively report their asset holdings. One 
study estimates that the Gini ratio for the distribution of wealth in the United 
States was 0.83 in 2001—indicating much more inequality than is found in 
the distribution of income. It has been estimated that in 1998 the top 1% of 
U.S. households owned about 38% of all household assets, and the top 10% 
owned about 71%, while the bottom 40% owned only 0.2% 
(DPSD/UNDESA,  2007).  
Equity in the distribution of wealth and resources is another critical 
element of inclusive societies. How the resources are allocated and utilized 
will significantly affect the orientation of  a society, either towards a more 
integrated, inclusive society, or an exclusive, polarized, and disintegrated 
one. Therefore, socio-economic policies should be geared towards managing 
equitable distribution and equal opportunities. Inclusive policies, instructions 
and programs that are sensitive to and cater to the less advantaged and 
vulnerable need to be put in place in all areas/sectors, including public 
health, and effectively implemented. There is a need for a strong monitoring 
and evaluation tools to demonstrate whether inclusiveness was actually 
achieved, as well as highlight areas for improvement. 
 
Concept of Wealth 
Wealth, in economics is an accumulation of goods having economic 
value. Economic value has several characteristics. First, an object must have 
utility. It must have, or be suspected of having, the capacity to satisfy some 
human want. Wealth can be increased by discovering uses for things 
previously not regarded as useful. Thus, the discovery of uses for petroleum 
in the 19th century added enormously to wealth. Second, economic goods 
must be in scarce supply (Clark, et al, 2008). Air does not normally have 
economic value because it is freely available. Air that is artificially 
conditioned is economically valuable, however, because it is relatively 
scarce. Third, economic goods must be transferable; that is, it must be 
possible to buy and sell them at definite market prices. Finally, an object 
must have measurable economic value. Because the only common unit of 
value today is money, the worth of goods must be expressible in monetary 
terms. Some economists also regard a definite skill in performing a job as 
human wealth as such skill has a determinable market value. 
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National wealth is the sum total of economic goods in the possession 
of the national, state, and local governments; business and nonprofit 
institutions; and the individual inhabitants of a country (Clark, et al, 2008). 
Systematic study of what constitutes a nation's wealth was begun in the 16th 
century by the mercantilists (Clark, et al, 2008). They advanced the thesis 
that a nation's stock of precious metals forms the most important part of its 
wealth. This view was generally accepted until the 18th century, when a 
reaction against the narrowness of mercantilist doctrine set in. It became 
evident that precious metals, particularly in the form of currency, were 
claims on wealth rather than wealth itself. Mercantilist doctrine was 
gradually replaced by the view of the physiocrats, a group of French 
economists of the 18th century that only farming, mining, fishing, and other 
extractive industries could contribute to the real wealth of nations. The 
Scottish economist Adam Smith broadened the physiocratic concept by 
stressing that wealth not only can be extracted but also can be created by 
manufacturing.  
This view was systematically formulated in the 19th century by the 
British economist John Stuart Mill (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997). His 
formulation, with certain relatively minor modifications, is the one generally 
accepted today According to the modern version of Mill's concept, a nation's 
wealth comprises only its measurable physical assets—that is, its land and 
other natural resources; the structures, roads, and other improvements on the 
land; the machinery and other durable goods used in production and 
distribution; inventories of goods in the possession of enterprises; and the 
goods accumulated at any one time in the hands of consumers. Paper money 
and securities are not included in estimates of a nation's wealth, because such 
assets are only claims against the physical assets that actually constitute 
wealth. Holdings of money and securities are counted, however, when these 
holdings represent claims against governments or nationals of foreign 
countries. If a nation's aggregate claims against foreigners exceed the claims 
of foreigners against the nation and its inhabitants, the difference is a net 
addition to national wealth. If claims by foreigners exceed claims against 
foreigners, the difference is a net decrease of national wealth. 
In the determination of national wealth, definite skills have a calculable 
market value. Currently, economists tend to give consideration to such items 
in socioeconomic accounting. Examples of factors that contribute to wealth 
but are not considered wealth are the good will and similar intangible assets 
of a firm, the institutions and traditions of a nation, and such attributes of a 
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A Philosophical Argument for Distributive Justice 
Distributive justice concerns the fair, just or equitable distribution of 
benefits and burdens. These benefits and burdens span all dimensions of 
social life and assume all forms, including income, economic wealth, 
political power, taxation, work obligations, education, shelter, health care, 
military service, community involvement and religious activities. Thus, 
justice arguments are often invoke d in connection with minimum  wage 
legislation, Affirmative Action policies, public education,  military 
conscription, litigation, as  well as with redistributive policies such as 
welfare, Medicare, aid to the developing world, progressive income taxes 
and inheritance taxes. Distributive justice enjoys a long and honored 
tradition in political, economic and social thought. It is central to Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean and Politics (in Thomson, 1997). In modern political 
philosophy, it has been construed in broad terms and seen as a foundational 
for policy formation and analysis. Michael Walzer (1986), for example, 
writes that “Distributive Justice is a large idea,” and for John Rawls (1971) 
“Justice is the first virtue of social institutions.” Thus, it is widely regarded 
as an important concept and influential force in philosophy and the social 
sciences.  
  This description begs the question, however, of what, exactly, 
constitutes a “fair,” “just” or “equitable” distribution (we will use these terms 
interchangeably). It seems that justice terminology is employed with 
considerable flexibility, and fairness arguments are sometimes even made by 
both parties on opposite ends of a dispute. There are at least three reasons for 
this. First, a large part of the literature on justice involves prescriptive 
theories: theories attempt to characterize a phenomenon in general terms, and 
prescriptive theories concern what “ought to be” (Neal, 1984). They can be 
contrasted with descriptive theories that seek to describe in general terms 
what “is.”   
Plato’s theory of Ideas and his rationalistic view of knowledge 
formed the foundation for his ethical and social idealism. The realm of 
eternal Ideas provides the standards or ideals according to which all objects 
and actions should be judged. The philosophical person, who refrains from 
sensual pleasures and searches instead for knowledge of abstract principles, 
finds in these ideals the basis for personal behavior and social institutions,. 
Personal virtue consists in a harmonious relation among the three parts of the 
soul: reason, emotion, and desire. Social justice likewise consists in harmony 
among the classes of society. The ideal state of a sound mind in a sound 
body requires that the intellect control the desires and passions, as the ideal 
state of society requires that the wisest individuals rule the pleasure-seeking 
masses. Truth, beauty, and justice coincide in the Idea of the Good, 
according to Plato; therefore, art that expresses moral values is the best art. 
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In his rather conservative social program, Plato supported the censorship of 
art forms that he believed corrupted the young and promoted social injustice. 
That first of judicial virtues, impartiality, is an obligation of justice, 
partly for the reason last mentioned; as being a necessary condition of the 
fulfillment of the other obligations of justice. But this is not the only source 
of the exalted rank, among human obligations, of those maxims of equality 
and impartiality, which, both in popular estimation and in that of the most 
enlightened are included among the precepts of justice (Carpenter, 2009). In 
one point of view, they may be considered as corollaries from the principles 
already lay down. If it is a duty to do to each according to his deserts, 
returning good for good as well as repressing evil by evil, it necessarily 
follows that we should treat all equally well (when no higher duty forbids) 
who have deserved equally well of us, and that society should treat all 
equally well who have deserved equally well of it, that is, who have deserved 
equally well absolutely (Carpenter, 2009). This is the highest abstract 
standard of social and distributive justice; towards which all institutions, and 
the efforts of all virtuous citizens, should be made in the utmost possible 
degree to converge. But this great moral duty rests upon a still deeper 
foundation, being a direct emanation from the first principle of morals, and 
not a mere logical corollary from secondary or derivative doctrines. It is 
involved in the very meaning of utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle. 
That principle is a mere form of words without rational signification, unless 
one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance 
made for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another's.  
The equal claim of everybody to happiness in the estimation of the 
moralist and the legislator, involves an equal claim to all the means of 
happiness, except in so far as the inevitable conditions of human life, and the 
general interest, in which that of every individual is included set limits to the 
maxim; and those limits ought to be strictly construed. As every other maxim 
of justice, so this is by no means applied or held applicable universally; on 
the contrary, as I have already remarked, it bends to every person's ideas of 
social expediency. But in whatever case it is deemed applicable at all, it is 
held to be the dictate of justice. All persons are deemed to have a right to 
equality of treatment, except when some recognized social expediency 
requires the reverse. And hence all social inequalities which have ceased to 
be considered expedient, assume the character not of simple inexpediency, 
but of injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how 
they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful that they themselves perhaps 
tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken notion of expediency, 
the correction of which would make that which they approve seem quite as 
monstrous as what they have at last learnt to condemn. The entire history of 
social improvement has been a series of transitions, by which one custom or 
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institution after another, from being a supposed primary necessity of social 
existence, has passed into the rank of a universally stigmatized injustice and 
tyranny. So it has been with the distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles 
and serfs, patricians and plebeians; and so it will be, and in part already is, 
with the aristocracies of colour, race, and sex. 
It appears from what has been said, that justice is a name for certain 
moral requirements, which, regarded collectively, stand higher in the scale of 
social utility, and are therefore of more paramount obligation, than any 
others; though particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is 
so important, as to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice (Marx, 
1993). Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty, to steal, 
or take by force, the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to 
officiate, the only qualified medical practitioner. In such cases, as we do not 
call anything justice which is not a virtue, we usually say, not that justice 
must give way to some other moral principle, but that what is just in ordinary 
cases is, by reason of that other principle, not just in the particular case. By 
this useful accommodation of language, the character of indefeasibility 
attributed to justice is kept up, and we are saved from the necessity of 
maintaining that there can be laudable injustice. 
The considerations which have now been adduced resolve, I conceive 
the only real difficulty in the utilitarian theory of morals. It has always been 
evident that all cases of justice are also cases of expediency: the difference is 
in the peculiar sentiment which attaches to the former, as contradistinguished 
from the latter. If this characteristic sentiment has been sufficiently 
accounted for; if there is no necessity to assume for it any peculiarity of 
origin; if it is simply the natural feeling of resentment, moralized by being 
made coextensive with the demands of social good; and if this feeling not 
only does but ought to exist in all the classes of cases to which the idea of 
justice corresponds; that idea no longer presents itself as a stumbling-block 
to the utilitarian ethics. Justice remains the appropriate name for certain 
social utilities which are vastly more important, and therefore more absolute 
and imperative, than any others are as a class (though not more so than 
others may be in particular cases); and which, therefore, ought to be, as well 
as naturally are, guarded by a sentiment not only different in degree, but also 
in kind; distinguished from the milder feeling which attaches to the mere 
idea of promoting human pleasure or convenience, at once by the more 
definite nature of its commands, and by the sterner character of its sanctions. 
 
Equitable Distribution of wealth to Attain Inclusive Society 
Most people own relatively little wealth, relying mainly on labor 
income and/or government, nonprofit, or family transfers to support their 
expenditures. It is possible to have negative wealth. This happens when the 
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value of a person’s debts (such as for a car, house, or credit cards) is greater 
than the value of her assets (Barron’s Business Dictionary, 2013). For people 
in the middle class, the equity they have in their house is often their most 
significant asset. On the other hand, those who do own substantial physical 
and financial wealth are generally in a position to put much of it into assets 
that increase in value over time and/or yield flows of capital income—which 
can in turn be invested in the acquisition of still more assets. A fair and just 
meting out of property between interested parties for example, a 
constitutional provision requiring an “equitable distribution” of income of a 
school fund requires distribution thereof to the several districts in proportion 
to school children enumerated and living in each district. 
An inclusive society is a society that over-rides differences of race, 
gender, class, generation, and geography, and ensures inclusion, equality of 
opportunity as well as capability of all members of the society to determine 
an agreed set of social institutions that govern social interaction (Expert 
Group Meeting on Promoting Social Integration, 2008). The World Summit 
for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995) defines an inclusive society as 
a “society for all in which every individual, each with rights and 
responsibilities, has an active role to play”. Such an inclusive society must be 
based on respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, cultural and 
religious diversity, social justice and the special needs of vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups, democratic participation and the rule of law. It is 
promoted by social policies that seek to reduce inequality and create flexible 
and tolerant societies that embrace all people. Elements of Inclusion include 
(Konow, 2003): 
• Inclusive policies and legislation  
•  Access to clean and safe places for living, work and recreation 
•  Access to information and communication  
• Access to public spaces   
• Access to resources   
• Access to basic services, education, health care, clean water and 
sanitation  
• Access to transportation  
•  Transparent and accountable decision-making processes   
•  Adequate income and employment  opportunities    
•  Affirmation of human rights  
•  Opportunity for personal development  
• Respect for diversity of Freedom (of choice, religion, etc. 
• Participation in decision-making  
•  Social protection  
• Solidarity 
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Broader Ethical Context for Equity: The Principle of Utility 
The focus of ethics in the world’s religions has been largely human 
centered. Humane treatment of humans is often seen not only as an end in 
itself but also as a means to eternal reward. While some have critiqued this 
anthropocentric perspective of world religions as rather narrow in light of 
environmental degradation and the loss of species, it is nonetheless important 
to recall that this perspective has also helped to promote major movements 
for social justice and human rights (Weimin, 1985). While social justice is an 
ongoing and unfinished effort of engagement, the challenge for the religions 
is also to enlarge their ethical concerns to include the more than human 
world. Social justice and environmental integrity are now being seen as part 
of a continuum. For some decades environmental philosophers have been 
developing the field of environmental ethics that can now provide enormous 
resources for the world’s religions in considering how to expand their ethical 
focus. Emerging bio-centric, zoo-centric, and eco-centric ethics are attentive 
to life forms, animal species, and ecosystems within a planetary context. A 
new “systems ethics” of part and whole, local and global, will assist the 
religions in articulating a more comprehensive form of environmental ethics 
from within their traditions. This is a major part of the development of 
religions into a dialogue with the sustainability movement. Humans are 
seeking an ethics to respond not only to suicide and homicide but also 
biocide and ecocide. 
Thus religions are gradually moving from exclusively 
anthropocentric ethics to eco-centric ethics and even to anthropo-cosmic 
ethics. The latter is a term used by T. Weiming (1985) to describe the vibrant 
interaction of Heaven, Earth, and humans in a Confucian worldview. In this 
context, humans complete the natural and cosmic world and become 
participants in the dynamic transformative life processes. This idea can 
extend ethics to apply to the land-species-human-planet-universe continuum. 
This is a fruitful yet still emerging path toward a comprehensive ethics for 
sustainability. This path has various challenges, including within the 
religions themselves. 
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to 
do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of 
right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to 
their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every 
effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate 
and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire, but in 
reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility 
recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, 
the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and 
European Scientific Journal   August  2014 edition vol.10, No.23   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
205 
of law. Systems which attempt to question it deal in sounds instead of sense, 
in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light.  
The principle of utility is the foundation of the present work: it will 
be proper therefore at the outset to give an explicit and determinate account 
of what is meant by it. By the principle of utility is meant that principle 
which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the 
tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of 
the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other 
words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action 
whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, 
but of every measure of government. By utility is meant that property in any 
object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or 
happiness (all this in the present case comes to the same thing), or (what 
comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, 
evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be 
the community in general, then the happiness of the community; if a 
particular individual, then the happiness of that individual. 
The interest of the community is one of the most general expressions 
that can occur in the phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning of it 
is often lost. When it has a meaning, it is this. The community is a fictitious 
body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting 
as it were its members. The interest of the community then is—the sum of 
the interests of the several members who compose it. It is in vain to talk of 
the interest of the community, without understanding what the interest of the 
individual is. A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be for the interest, 
of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures; or, 
what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains. 
An action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of 
utility, or, for shortness sake, to utility (meaning with respect to the 
community at large), when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of 
the community is greater than any it has to diminish it. 
vii. A measure of government (which is but a particular kind of action, 
performed by a particular person or persons) may be said to be conformable 
to or dictated by the principle of utility, when in like manner the tendency 
which it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any 
which it has to diminish it. When an action, or in particular a measure of 
government, is supposed by a man to be conformable to the principle of 
utility, it may be convenient, for the purposes of discourse, to imagine a kind 
of law or dictate, called a law or dictate of utility; and to speak of the action 
in question, as being conformable to such law or dictate. 
A man may be said to be a partisan of the principle of utility, when 
the approbation or disapprobation he annexes to any action, or to any 
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measure, is determined by and proportioned to the tendency which he 
conceives it to have to augment or to diminish the happiness of the 
community; or in other words, to its conformity or unconformity to the laws 
or dictates of utility. Of an action that is conformable to the principle of 
utility, one may always say either that it is one that ought to be done, or at 
least that it is not one that ought not to be done. One may say also that it is 
right it should be done—at least that it is not wrong it should be done; that it 
is a right action—at least that it is not a wrong action. When thus interpreted, 
the words ought, and right and wrong, and others of that stamp have a 
meaning: when otherwise, they have none. Has the rectitude of this principle 
been ever formally contested? It should seem that it had, by those who have 
not known what they have been meaning. Is it susceptible of any direct 
proof? It should seem not; for that which is used to prove everything else, 
cannot itself be proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement 
somewhere. To give such proof is as impossible as it is needless. Not that 
there is or ever has been that human creature breathing, however stupid or 
perverse, who has not on many, perhaps on most occasions of his life, 
deferred to it. By the natural constitution of the human frame, on most 
occasions of their lives men in general embrace this principle, without 
thinking of it: if not for the ordering of their own actions, yet for the trying of 
their own actions, as well as of those of other men. There have been, at the 
same time, not many perhaps even of the most intelligent, who have been 
disposed to embrace it purely and without reserve. There are even few who 
have not taken some occasion or other to quarrel with it, either on account of 
their not understanding always how to apply it, or on account of some 
prejudice or other which they were afraid to examine into, or could not bear 
to part with. For such is the stuff that man is made of: in principle and in 
practice, in a right track and in a wrong one, the rarest of all human qualities 
is consistency. 
When a man attempts to combat the principle of utility, it is with 
reasons drawn, without his being aware of it, from that very principle itself. 
His arguments, if they prove anything, prove not that the principle is wrong, 
but that, according to the applications he supposes to be made of it, it is 
misapplied. Is it possible for a man to move the earth? Yes; but he must first 
find out another earth to stand upon. To disprove the propriety of it by 
arguments is impossible; but, from the causes that have been mentioned, or 
from some confused or partial view of it, a man may happen to be disposed 
not to relish it. Where this is the case, if he thinks the settling of his opinions 
on such a subject worth the trouble, let him take the following steps, and at 
length, perhaps, he may come to reconcile himself to it: 
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 (1) Let him settle with himself whether he would wish to discard this 
principle altogether; if so, let him consider what it is that all his reasoning (in 
matters of politics especially) can amount to? 
 (2) If he would, let him settle with himself whether he would judge 
and act without any principle, or whether there is any other he would judge 
and act by? 
 (3) If there be, let him examine and satisfy himself whether the 
principle he thinks he has found is really any separate intelligible principle; 
or whether it be not a mere principle in words, a kind of phrase, which at 
bottom expresses neither more nor less than the mere averment of his own 
unfounded sentiments—that is, what in another person he might be apt to 
call caprice? 
 (4) If he is inclined to think that his own approbation or 
disapprobation annexed to the idea of an act, without any regard to its 
consequences, is a sufficient foundation for him to judge and act upon, let 
him ask himself whether his sentiment is to be a standard of right and wrong 
with respect to every other man, or whether every man's sentiment has the 
same privilege of being a standard to itself? 
 (5) In the first case, let him ask himself whether his principle is not 
despotically, and hostile to all the rest of human race. 
 (6) In the second case, whether it is not anarchical, and whether at 
this rate there are not as many different standards of right and wrong as there 
are men? And whether even to the same man, the same thing which is right 
today may not (without the least change in its nature) be wrong tomorrow? 
And whether the same thing is not right and wrong in the same place at the 
same time? And in either case, whether all argument is not at an end? And 
whether, when two men have said, 'I like this,' and 'I don't like it,' they can 
(upon such a principle) have anything more to say? 
 (7) If he should have said to himself, No: for that the sentiment which 
he proposes as a standard must be grounded on reflection, let him say on 
what particulars the reflection is to turn? If on particulars having relation to 
the utility of the act, then let him say whether this is not deserting his own 
principle, and borrowing assistance from that very one in opposition to 
which he sets it up; or if not on those particulars, on what other particulars? 
 (8) If he should be for compounding the matter, and adopting his own 
principle in part, and the principle of utility in part, let him say how far he 
will adopt it? 
 (9) When he has settled with himself where he will stop, then let him 
ask himself how he justifies to himself the adopting it so far? And why he 
will not adopt it any farther? 
 (10) Admitting any other principle than the principle of utility to be a 
right principle, a principle that it is right for a man to pursue; admitting (what 
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is not true) that the word 'right' can have a meaning without reference to 
utility, let him say whether there is any such thing as a motive that a man can 
have to pursue the dictates of it: if there is, let him say what that motive is, 
and how it is to be distinguished from those which enforce the dictates of 
utility; if not, then lastly let him say what it is this other principle can be 
good for? (Burtt, 1939). 
 
Influence of Religion on the Equitable Distribution of Wealth: An 
Analysis 
A primitive man may invest a great deal of time and skill - an 
economic decision – to carve the appropriate symbols or designs on a sacred 
drum, because they contribute to its religious efficacy. Were it not for their 
religious meaning, he would not value them so highly and would be 
unwilling to spend so much for them. Similarly, a church may invest a great 
deal of moneyed a stained glass window, because of the meaning it has for 
the members. These are rather specific economic problems, and we shall not, 
therefore, give them further attention. It is in the influences on the 
distribution of wealth and income that religion has its most significant 
economic effects; and it is also at this point that the economic consequences 
of religion are most important for society, culture, and personality. Hence the 
sociologist of religion must explore this question carefully. 
In the first place, religious activity everywhere receivers a certain 
share – often a fairly large share – of the wealth of a society. Even those 
groups that live on the edge of subsistence devote part of their substance to 
the maintenance of holy places, sacrifices, ceremonial feasts, sacred objects, 
and the like. Indeed, if there is any correlation between the amount of wealth 
of a society and the proportion of its wealth that is spent for religion, it may 
be an inverse one: the poorer the society or group, the higher the proportion 
of its wealth that is devoted to religious activity. Part of this expenditure, in 
societies where religious specialists have appeared, is used to support the 
priestly class. This adds a new dimension to the question of the economic 
significance of religion, especially where there is no clear-cut determination 
by the religious values themselves of the appropriate share of the income that 
should go to the religious professionals. The traditions may encourage 
mendicancy, as with the early Buddhists or some Christian monastic. But 
more commonly the religious norms encourage, or at least permit, the group 
to strive for a large share of the wealth. The religious views may then 
combine with secular ambitions among the clergy, to bring them substantial 
incomes. As mediators, if not as dispensers, of salvation, they are often in a 
commanding position. If their religious authority is combined, by a churchly 
decision, with the power of secular authorities, they may dominate or share 
in the ruling of the society and even acquire substantial wealth. Some will 
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say at this point: this is not a description of the economic power of religion, 
but of the transformation of religion into a secular quest, under religious 
guise. But it is precisely in the possibilities of such transformation, in the 
frequency with which religious institutions take on secular power that many 
of the implications of religion for society reside. Sometimes it is the religious 
professionals themselves who gain wealth and power: sometimes it is a 
secular group who acquire religious sponsorship for their claims to hold, or 
to win, wealth and power; often it is both. 
Analysis of the conditions under which these various possibilities 
occur is an important task. The following variables seem to be involved as 
some of the evidences relating to religion and the distribution of wealth 
(Tucker & Grim, 2009): 
i. The Degree of Secularization. Where most of the questions of life 
have a religious aspect, the importance of religion for economics is 
likely to be large, and the priestly class likely to be well supported. 
Where many important questions- e.g. health, technology – are 
thought of primarily in secular terms, as in the united states today, the 
economic influence of religion is reduced. 
ii. The Nature of the Religious Traditions and Organizations. Religious 
in which ethical questions are least important, those in which the 
means to salvation are most thoroughly institutionalized, most under 
the domination of one ecclesiastical group, and least under the 
control of the individual believer, are those that aid the acquisition of 
power by the professional religious leaders. 
iii. The Nature of Power Distribution in the Secular Aspects of society. 
When economic and political powers are highly concentrated in the 
hands of a small ruling group, the higher clergy are likely to occupy 
positions of influence and to share generously in the income of a 
society. Under such circumstances, churchly compromise with ‘’the 
world’’ is carried very far; the rulers and their practices are upheld 
and defended with a minimum of criticism. This is partly because the 
dilemma of religious leaders which we have discussed is particularly 
sharp in authoritarian societies: and it is partly because the secular 
gains for the clergy, if they will support the ruling group, are large in 
such societies. In democratic situations, where power is diffused, the 
dominant group is less willing to share influence and income with 
religious leaders if they will sanctify their dominant position. 
Powerful secular groups have little to gain thereby, because the lower 
strata of society have other means – political action, labour unions, 
etc. – of making their claims in any event. It is of little value to block 
one hole in a sieve, of little value to inhibit the claims to a greater 
share of life’s goods under religious auspices if they are going to 
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have other auspices anyway. Moreover, the lower classes, in a 
democratic society, are less likely to accept a religious system that 
has accommodated itself thoroughly to the dominant groups, because 
they have other means of working for their goals. 
These three variables are closely interrelated. Their combined effect 
can be to influence strongly the wealth of the churches and the income of the 
clergy. In Nigeria, for example, religious professionals are not, on the 
average, well paid. Their income is below that of industrial workers. Each of 
the above variables contributes to this result: Many questions that formerly 
had a strong religious aspect have been substantially secularized; there is a 
strong emphasis on religious toleration and the right of an individual to be 
his own religious interpreter – the opposite of a monopoly on the means of 
salvation; and a secular power is quite extensively diffused. When such a 
situation is compared with that of medieval Europe, the importance of the 
three factors in affecting the wealth of the church and the income of the 
clergy is well shown. In medieval times, the interpretation of medical, 
agricultural, astronomical, and other kinds of events was far less secularized. 
One church, organized into an elaborate hierarchy with a monopoly over 
sacraments, using a language unknown to the masses of people, dominated 
the religious scene. Individual initiative in religious matters, the expression 
of the belief that the layman could have dealings directly with God, without 
the need for the intercession of the church, were heretical acts justifying 
server punishment. Finally, the secular setting was one in which power was 
highly concentrated in the hand of the hereditary nobility. Under these 
circumstances, the churches and the clergy commanded a great deal of 
wealth. It was very from affluent; but the total wealth, especially in land, was 
great. Preserved Smith writes: 
In the analysis of the influence of religion and religious institutions 
on the distribution of wealth, however, it is not the effects on the priestly 
class that have received most attention or are most important, for they are 
generally a fairly small proportion of the population. The use of religion to 
hold or to acquire a greater share of the wealth by secular classes and groups, 
from all levels of society, is the more fundamental phenomenon. The 
analysis of the factors affecting the income of professional religious leaders 
can be brought within this larger question, for it is the nature of their 
association with the secular groups that is largely responsible for their 
income position.  
Description of the use of religion by secular groups to hold or acquire 
scarce values is very closely related to the topic of religion and social 
stratification. Our concern here, however, is not so much with the variations 
in beliefs, rites, and religious group structure among social strata and the 
several reasons for the these variations. It is more with the processes of 
European Scientific Journal   August  2014 edition vol.10, No.23   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
211 
interaction by means of which religion is used to justify specifically 
economic claims. This will require that we explore, more fully than we have 
up until now, the churches of the middle and upper classes, as we have 
already mentioned the sects of the lower classes. The sects have seldom, at 
least for long, made direct economic claims on the basis of frustrated their 
desires for improving their status by appeals to therefore, have been more 
inclined to redefine the meaning of their economic status (poverty is a sign 
of virtue; this life is scarcely significant anyway) than to attack it. The 
consequences of their religious beliefs for economic matters have been more 
indirect than direct, latent rather than manifest functions. This is true whether 
those consequences have been to make them less rigid, by encouraging 
frugality and industry. 
It is otherwise with the middle and upper classes. They face many 
serious difficulties, to be sure, but their economic hopes have been 
substantially rewarded, not frustrated. Their task is not to adjust to poverty 
and powerlessness, but to feel justified in their good fortune. This too can be 
a difficult problem, particularly among those who share a religious tradition 
that embodies a large measure of the insights and responses of persons who 
were dealing with ill – fortune. This is true of all major religions. They are 
substantially the products of suffering, of a sense of evil, of unhappiness, 
often as these problems have been developed in the minds of people 
peculiarly sensitive to them. The well-to-do share these religions because 
they are brought up in societies where they prevail, but more importantly 
because they too, in the last analysis, face the problems of suffering and evil, 
even if in somewhat different ways. So they embrace religions that help them 
struggle with these difficulties. But they do not suffer from poverty. Can they 
get religious sponsorship for this lack of suffering? They succeed in doing so 
in the churches; but this cannot be done without transforming them, to a 
greater or lesser degree, into secular institutions, reducing their ability to 
help other classes, and in the long run, weakening their ability to deal with 
the particularly religious problems of the dominant classes themselves. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Clearly stated religions have a central role in the formulation of 
worldviews that orient us to the natural world and the articulation of ethics 
that guide human behavior (Ottuh, Ottuh & Aitufe, 2014). The size and 
complexity of the problems societies face today require collaborative efforts 
both among the religions and in dialogue with other key domains of human 
endeavour. Religions, thus, need to be in conversation with sectors such as 
science, economics, education, and public policy that can address economic 
and environmental issues. Economic and environmental changes will be 
motivated by these disciplines in very specific ways: namely, economic 
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incentives will be central to adequate distribution of resources, scientific 
analysis will be critical to understanding nature’s economy, educational 
awareness will be indispensable to creating modes of sustainable life, public 
policy recommendations will be invaluable in shaping national and 
international priorities, and moral and spiritual values will be crucial for the 
transformations required for life in an ecological age.   Thomas Berry has 
observed that assisting humans by egocentricizing the natural world cannot 
lead to a sustainable human community. The only sustainable community is 
one that fits the human economy into the ever-renewing economy of the 
planet. The human system, in its every aspect, is a subsystem of the Earth 
system, whether we are speaking of economics or physical well being or 
rules of law. In essence, human flourishing and planetary prosperity are 
intimately linked. 
In alignment with these "ecojustice" and equity concerns, religions 
can encourage values and ethics of reverence, respect, restraint, 
redistribution, responsibility, and renewal for formulating a broader 
economic ethics that includes humans, ecosystems, and other species. With 
the help of religions humans are now advocating for a reverence for an 
inclusive society and it’s long evolutionary unfolding, respect for the human 
species who share the society with other inhuman. Restraint in the use of 
natural resources on which all life depends, equitable distribution of wealth, 
recognition of responsibility of humans for the continuity of life into future 
generations, and renewal of the energies for the great work of building a 
sustainable inclusive society.  These are the virtues for sustainability, equity 
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